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The present work addresses a fundamental issue about human sociality: Why
are human behavior and emotions towards long-term partners and relation-
ships so often seemingly out of tune with rationality? Is there something fun-
damentally rational behind seemingly irrational commitment? These overar-
ching questions are motivated by a vast and growing body of empirical evi-
dence about the way people make decisions in long-term relationships. The
evidence points to a mismatch between predictions of simple self-interested
rationality and actual behavior that is influenced by a complex interaction be-
tween emotions and rational reasoning. To find an answer for these questions,
we point to a common explanatory framework, evolutionary theory, which is
capable of integrating theories about emotionality and rationality that would
otherwise individually lead to different predictions about behavior in inter-
personal relationships.
In line with an important distinction in the evolutionary approach, we pro-
vided explanations on two levels of causality. First, building on existing re-
search about conditions of the human ancestral environment, we advanced
a computational model (Chapters 2-4) to test how a preference for interper-
sonal commitment could have evolved and out-competed various alternative
preferences of opportunism and calculative rationality (ultimate explanation).
Second, we turned to empirical examination of the ultimate explanation. We
referred to existing evidence and then added to it our own cross-cultural find-
ings. Together these suggest the existence of a direct emotional-cognitive
mechanism (proximate explanation) producing commitment behavior, which
is most easily explained as a remnant from a long gone era of evolutionary
adaptation (Chapter 5). After this, we explicitly focused on exchange theoretic
(non-evolutionary) explanations of commitment (Chapter 6) and resolved an
empirical puzzle about uncertainty that arose from the contradiction between
our cross-cultural findings and existing literature.
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7.1 Summary of results
To show that commitment could have been an evolved strategy, we simu-
lated human interactions under assumed conditions of the human ancestral
environment (Chapters 2-4) and found that strategies that possess a tendency
for commitment outperform other strategies, such as fair reciprocation. Our
results were stable across simulations, where individual strategies were
matched against each other in an ecological competition, as well as in genetic
simulations, where genotypes of mutating strategies contested their strengths
under evolutionary selection pressures.
In the ancestral environment people lived together in relatively small
groups. Constant threats from a harsh natural environment led to a much
higher frequency of life-threatening situations than today (Sterelny, 2003).
In such an unpredictably “unfair” environment, imbalances between ex-
change partners cannot be avoided due to the uneven occurrence of hazards.
Consequently, fair strategies suffer from their lack of tolerance when they
interact with their own kind. A more lenient strategy of commitment avoids
this pitfall, without being overly tolerant. Another reason behind the suc-
cess of commitment lies in the structure of the exchange networks that it
spontaneously causes to emerge. In a network of committed people, usually
each person can easily decide whom to help and everyone is accounted for.
Committed agents thus avoid overloading a few designated individuals
with interaction requests and instead spontaneously create a structure that
ensures an efficient coordination of help requests and help provision. Fair
strategies on the other hand are inclined to keep their relationships strictly
in balance, which results in spreading interaction requests evenly across the
population. During times of need, this structure is inefficient because fair
agents in small groups generate overlapping personal networks so that often
too many ask help from the same agent at the same time. We also showed that
the disadvantage of fair reciprocity increases as the environment becomes
harsher (Chapter 3).
But could it really have been viable in a harsh and unpredictable ances-
tral environment to stay committed to people with lower helping capability,
instead of investing in relationships with more attractive others? In Chapter
4 we show that even when there are large differences between individuals in
helping capability, it is still better to have a preference for helping old friends
(commitment) than a preference for helping the most attractive others. Never-
theless, Chapter 4 also emphasizes the importance of fairness, which is prob-
ably another strong and cross-culturally stable preference (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Heinrich et al., 2001; Fehr et al., 2002). We found that under large in-
equalities in the population, a preference for fairness is more important for
viability than commitment.
In lack of a time machine, evolutionary (ultimate) theories are troublesome
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to test directly. The next best solution is to derive proximate mechanisms from
the ultimate theory, and test the existence of these proximate mechanisms.
In addition, such a complex theory based on human evolution will only be
attractive if it is able to explainmore empirical anomalies than simpler theories
that make fewer assumptions.
We followed this path with regard to the ultimate theory of interpersonal
commitment. If interpersonal commitment indeed evolved and stabilized
through selection during countless years of ontogeny, we should be able to
detect the resulting proximate mechanisms in contemporary societies. Is there
a cross-culturally observable tendency to remain committed to previous part-
ners? Does this tendency remain relatively stable across different situations
where rationality would prescribe different behaviors, i.e. is it hardwired? In
Chapter 5, we uncovered support for the notion that people possess such a
commitment bias: they hold on to their partners simply as a result of expo-
sure, not only as a result of instrumental benefits. We created an experiment
where a rational actor would be indifferent between two interaction partners:
one that cooperated in a large interaction, and another that cooperated in
multiple small interactions over time. The total cost incurred by either partner
is equal, therefore there is no reason to rationally suspect better intentions
behind one than the other. Still, we found that people were more likely to
choose the partner that cooperated over a period of time, suggesting that
extended exposure in itself creates a force toward stabilizing a relationship,
independently from the size of the benefit.
Note that this exposure explanation for commitment might appear to be
reducible to a simpler cognitive mechanism that is already proven to be uni-
versal among humans and many animals, reinforcement learning (Thorndike,
1911; Homans, 1961; Macy and Flache, 2002). Is it not so that people sim-
ply connect a stimulus of being exposed to another person with positive out-
comes, and thus reinforce the need for further exposure? Not necessarily. The
idea behind our exposure explanation is not that people are more likely to be-
come committed to attractive/valuable partners but that repeated encounters,
per se, increase the positive perception of the partner and this is what leads to
increased commitment.
Another finding of our experiment, reported in Chapter 5, was that uncer-
tainty decreased commitment. This is largely in contradiction with another
well-established mechanism that predicts more commitment (Kollock, 1994;
Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994; Yamagishi et al., 1998). What is the reason
for this opposite effect? This was the main question motivating our study re-
ported in Chapter 6. The puzzle also leads to another question: is there an al-
ternative reason based on uncertainty reduction for why people become com-
mitted, if not to avoid untrustworthy strangers? We found empirical support
that social uncertainty has a much less universal effect on commitment than
previously suggested (see Kollock, 1994; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994; Ya-
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magishi et al., 1998), because it only affects people who themselves wish to be
cooperative, and have an opportunity to meet fellow cooperators. Moreover,
we also found that there is at least one other important source of uncertainty
that has been neglected in the exchange-commitment literature: resources.
Similarly to social uncertainty, resource uncertainty increases commitment, es-
pecially when one has an opportunity to meet a high-resource partner.
Why are some people more committed than others? In order to explain
some of the individual differences in commitment behavior, we linked the ef-
fect of resource and social uncertainty to psychological mechanisms. Building
especially on Yamagishi’s works, we confirmed that general trust in people
has a negative effect on the tendency to become committed to steady partners.
Furthermore, we also showed that while general trust decreases commitment,
optimism in a more general sense has a similar negative effect. Those who
are generally optimistic are more likely to dissolve existing relationships and
venture interaction with strangers.
In sum, Chapters 2 to 6 answered each research question raised in Chapter
1. When taken together, these answers provide an answer to our overarching
questions. Theoretical results from the agent-based computational models, as
well as empirical results from the cross-cultural laboratory experiments, give
support to the conjecture that humans possess an innate trait for commitment
(or attachment) to relationship partners. This trait most likely evolved in the
human ancestral environment where it served as an even stronger factor of
success (and survival) than in contemporary societies.
Although the balance of evidence tips toward an evolutionary explana-
tion for commitment that integrates emotional mechanisms next to rational
motives, it must be pointed out that (1) there are other, possibly evolved, pref-
erences, which influence behavior in long-term relationships, and (2) an evo-
lutionary framework is not always necessary to understand or predict com-
mitment behavior. In Chapters 2 to 4 we found that other preferences, such
as calculative reciprocity (fairness) have certain advantages compared to com-
mitment, and under certain conditions outcompete it. Then, in Chapter 6 we
specifically focused on advancing the rational (exchange theoretic) explana-
tion for commitment, related to uncertainty. We could do so, because in the
case of uncertainty reduction, fewer assumptions are sufficient to explain dif-
ferences in commitment behavior.
7.2 General discussion
Does evolutionary theory help to explain aspects of contemporary human be-
havior, and commitment behavior in particular? If so, how does our work fit
into the broader field of commitment research? What have we added to exist-
ing knowledge, and what are the novel aspects of our work? Finally, where do
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the limits of our theorizing lie? These are the questions covered in this section.
7.2.1 In defense of evolutionary theory in the social sciences
This dissertation advances an evolutionary explanation for why people make
seemingly irrational decisions, based partially on emotions, about relation-
ships. There is disagreement within the social sciences, especially in sociol-
ogy, whether human behavior can at all be explained from an evolutionary
perspective. While sociobiology has had great success in explaining seem-
ingly irrational behaviors, such as altruism, among animals (Hamilton, 1964,
1972; Trivers, 1971, 1974; Maynard Smith, 1974), attempts to extend the same
arguments to humans attracted fierce scientific debate (see Holcomb, 1993).
Introducing a domain-specific approach in addition to the domain-
generality of sociobiology, a new field, evolutionary psychology, has created
new momentum in this debate. Evolutionary psychology has proved suc-
cessful in using evolutionary theory to derive and empirically corroborate a
range of hypotheses about human preferences and behavior, such as cheater
detection, mating preferences, language acquisition, incest avoidance, etc.
One of the strengths of evolutionary psychology is its elegance in explain-
ing many types of human behaviors that were previously thought to be sim-
ply irrational or erroneous. Examples range from explanations for cognitive
biases (e.g. Error Management Theory, see Haselton and Buss, 2000; Hasel-
ton and Nettle, 2006) to sensory illusions (e.g. Evolved Navigation Theory,
see Jackson and Cormack, 2006). These seemingly irrational tendencies are
explained within a clear functional framework that is increasingly well sup-
ported by empirical evidence.
Functional (or holistic) theories have been heavily criticized, leading many
to argue that they are not real theories at all, failing to meet standards of the
logical positivist philosophy of science. The root of the criticism is that a func-
tion, intention or goal, on which these theories are based, becomes manifest
only at a later point in time. And as future things cannot be considered an-
tecedent conditions, functional explanations cannot be considered causal ones
(Looijen, 1998).
It is important to realize that evolutionary theory, which modern biology
is based upon, is not the usual kind of functional theory. In fact, arguments
based on evolutionary selection only appear to be functional but in fact they are
perfectly acceptable, causally adequate theories. To understand why, consider
the following simple idea:
Putting aside the question of how life originally appeared, we can formu-
late two basic assumptions:
1. Living organisms can only be created by other living organisms, through
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reproduction1.
2. When organisms (parents) reproduce, the new organism (offspring) will
resemble the original organism to a high degree (inheritance).
Now, an argument, for example, that an offspring has an eye in order to see
and thus better be able to survive, appears to be a functional explanation, since
the offspring had to have an eye before the function of seeing came into exis-
tence. But taken together with the previous two assumptions, the argument
can easily be turned into a perfectly valid, causal explanation: an eye served
the parent well, so much that it managed to stay alive and reproduce, creat-
ing an offspring, which then inherited the eye. This explanation is not only
causally correct but benefits from the additional credibility it gains from the
functionalist aspect.
This evolutionary functionalism becomes a substitute for the optimality
(e.g. maximal utility) that rational choice theories usually require to explain
behavior. Our explanation of interpersonal commitments draws on the in-
creased functional value that committed relationships had in our evolutionary
past, in order to explain their existence in situations when immediate rational
optimality is missing.
7.2.2 Placing our work
How do our model and findings fit into a theoretical framework of interper-
sonal relationships in the ancestral environment? Table 7.1 shows a rough clas-
sification of important interpersonal relationship types that are likely to have
been present in the ancestral environment, along with the ultimate challenge
they addressed (i.e. adaptive benefit) and some of the underlying emotions
they are associatedwith (proximatemechanisms). Notice that the type of com-
mitment that our simulations most closely resemble is friendship. A specific
adaptation for commitment is especially important in the case of this non-kin,
non-reproductive type of relationship. However, note also that once a trait for
interpersonal commitment is in place it has a stabilizing effect on all types of
relationships listed. This notion is indeed supported by research arguing that
interpersonal experiences in infancy with close kin act as a foundation for the
capacity for stable relationships with non-kin in adults (Lundeen, 1999).
1Note that cloning constitutes a special exception from this argument, and shows that technol-
ogy clearly has the potential to disrupt the natural dynamic of evolutionary selection. Neverthe-
less, this in itself does not invalidate the subsequent argument about our prehistoric evolutionary
past.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































140 Chapter 7. Conclusions
There are two perspectives in the existing literature about the seemingly
irrational tendency to hold on to long-term partners. One is to regard it as
a devotion or promise to stay in a relationship, that is kept beyond rational
incentives, being internally enforced by a host of emotions such as love, at-
traction or a desire to keep a clean conscience. This line is apparent in the
works of Frank (1988) and Nesse (2001a).
The other approach is to regard this seemingly irrational tendency as a
basic emotional attachment that is a fundamental characteristic of humans,
extended not only towards other people but also toward objects and abstract
ideas. This line is advocated in particular by Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky
(2005) and Pedersen (2004). Note that while we tried to give credit to both
approaches throughout this work, the use of the word “commitment” unfairly
biases attention toward the first approach.
The argument for the evolutionary origins of interpersonal commitment
is increasingly credible and convincing, being able to rely on findings from
other disciplines. Outside the social sciences there are at least two important
disciplines that provide a synergy for the evolutionary argument: primatology
and the cognitive neurosciences.
Although several animal species, especially birds and some mammals, ex-
hibit long-term relationships among kin or monogamous sex partners (Hrdy,
1999; Carter, 1998), it is among primates that emotionally attached relation-
ships are especially prominent. Friendships and other alliances between in-
dividuals who are not relatives or sexual partners have been identified and
found to increase social complexity (DeWaal, 1996). Studies suggest that early
human language evolved in order to facilitate long-term cooperative interper-
sonal relationships. Researchers found a clear positive association between
group size and the call-repertoire of primates, as well as between grooming
and call-repertoire, suggesting that the original purpose of language was to
efficiently groom multiple individuals at the same time (McComb and Sem-
ple, 2005). Proliferation of facial expressions, gestures, vocalizations and other
types of social communication created a need for increased cognitive capabil-
ities, and possibly led to the increase of intelligence in human ancestors (Ped-
ersen, 2004).
Fortunately, the cognitive neurosciences are also increasingly interested
and capable of uncovering mechanisms in the brain related to sociality in gen-
eral, and bonding and attachment in particular. Studies found that when peo-
ple fall in love, serotonin levels plummet and the brain’s reward centers are
flooded with dopamine. This gives an emotional high similar to an addictive
drug, creating powerful links in our minds between pleasure and the object of
our affection, making people addicted to the loved one (Aron et al., 2005).
Other hormones, such as oxytocin and vasopressin, express their effect
later in the relationship, and are crucial in forming long-term partnerships.
Researchers found that couples that have been together for several years show
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increased brain activity associated with these chemicals, when they looked at
pictures of their long-term partner (Aron et al., 2005). When administering
oxytocin to experimental subjects, researchers were able to artificially increase
trust in social interactions (Kosfeld et al., 2005). Oxytocin is also known to be
produced when couples have sex and touch, kiss and massage each other.
There is also evidence that similar biological mechanisms are triggered in
the absence of a romantic partner as in infants who are separated from their
mother, leading to various levels of separation anxiety (Carter, 1998). A con-
sensus is starting to emerge that our neural systems exhibit built-in functions
that are designed to respond to the presence or absence of social bonds (Depue
and Morrone-Strupinsky, 2005).
7.2.3 Innovations of the present work
This work is an attempt to reconcile existing models of rationality with peo-
ple’s seemingly irrational, emotionally based tendency to keep existing rela-
tionships going. As such, it is among the first attempts to combine deep-seated
emotional preferences and rationality into an evolutionary argument that ex-
plains interpersonal commitments.
While there have already been forceful attempts to argue for the evolution-
ary origins of a more general form of commitment, the tendency to uphold
promises and threats (Frank, 1988; Nesse, 2001a), interpersonal commitment
has received surprisingly little attention. This is even more surprising, when
one looks closer at Frank’s and Nesse’s work. In one of their key examples
they both argue that humans have evolved a capacity that facilitates keeping
promises through emotions, which explains why people remain committed to
their spouses, despite more “rational” alternatives. But is it not more plausible
that humans have evolved the capacity to remain in relationships directly, not
as a bi-product of honesty, avoidance of guilt, etc.?
Our work is also pioneering in testing competitive advantages of com-
mitment and calculative reciprocity under different conditions of social in-
equality. Our simulation studies (Chapters 2-4) outline a possible evolution-
ary pathway for the emergence of commitment behavior under minimalistic
assumptions about the human ancestral environment, strengthening the ulti-
mate answer for our original overarching research question.
To our knowledge, the mere exposure effect has not been linked to inter-
personal commitment before, despite their very obvious connection. Our core
argument is that (1) repeated exposure to the same person increases positive
evaluations and trust toward the person, holding actual positive experiences
and uncertainty about trustworthiness constant; (2) this necessarily leads to
becoming more committed to the person; and (3) such behavior was espe-
cially adaptive in the ancestral environment where people were much more
reliant on the help of other individuals. To strengthen the leap from (2) to (3)
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we also rule out cultural explanations for the existence of such a tendency by
replicating our experiments in three countries, the Netherlands, China and the
USA.
Our main endeavor to reconcile emotionality with rationality concentrates
on describing and examining the emotional aspects of decision-making. In ad-
dition, we also advance existing explanations for the instrumental rationality
of interpersonal commitment by refining its link with uncertainty. Previous
literature concentrated exclusively on the positive effect of social uncertainty
on commitment. We argue that the effect of social uncertainty is less general
than previous literature suggested and point to another form of uncertainty,
about resources, that similarly leads to commitment behavior.
7.2.4 Possible criticism
A key source of criticism of our work is that we advocate an evolutionary ex-
planation for social behavior. This stems from twomore specific problems, one
methodological and one substantial. First, evolutionary explanations, includ-
ing the original ones by Darwin (1859), are difficult to empirically test because
we are short of direct evidence about actual evolutionary trajectories. The
strength of the evolutionary framework itself lies in the countless sub-theories
that are all based on the simple but powerful dynamics of reproduction, mu-
tation and selection and manage to give a coherent explanation for what we
see in the biological world around us today.
Another, more specific problem is that by explaining human behavior
through evolved preferences we implicitly refer to underlying biological
mechanisms. This is bound to draw fierce criticism, especially from those
who argue for the primacy of culture and society as determinants of human
behavior. But the idea that behavior is biologically determined to a certain
extent, is receiving increasing support from research in the cognitive neuro-
sciences. Whenever relevant, we pointed out such links throughout preceding
chapters and in Section 7.2.2 above.
One related epistemological problem is that we argue for the existence and
relative strength of a universal human characteristic. Research in the social
and behavioral sciences usually tries to pinpoint and explain differences be-
tween individuals. In our case, we argue about a difference between the entire
population and a fictive reference group. More precisely, we need to argue that
everyone is universally more committed than would be rational, but there is
no real “rational population” to compare to.
Therefore, what we tried to test (in Chapter 5) is whether people behave
differently under different conditions that otherwise do not differ when
viewed from a purely rational perspective. We found support for the idea
that this difference in behavior is cross-culturally stable. An explanation
based on natural selection does not posit that every member of the population
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necessarily possesses the evolved trait, nor that the trait is equally manifest in
each individual. Rather, it argues about the population mean or frequency of
the trait, which itself is subject to selection, leaving ample room for individual
differences. Although showing such individual differences was not our main
focus, we uncovered support in Chapter 6 that commitment is systematically
related to individual personality characteristics, such as trust and optimism.
Another major point for criticism is that interpersonal commitment, as a
collective concept for many types of relationships that people may have, is too
general. It could be argued that an explanation for friendships should have lit-
tle or nothing in common with an explanation for marriage. This is, however,
precisely what we propose. Although different types of relationships have dif-
ferent purposes, there are many common features that make them inherently
similar. First, relationships by definition comprise repeated interaction. Sec-
ond, there is always a trust issue between partners. Third, many relationships
require exclusivity, which leads to a dilemma of choice between alternative
partners.
The fact that our proposed mechanisms, emotional commitment, mere ex-
posure, and uncertainty reduction are assumed to exist across most interper-
sonal relationships makes them very general. Therefore, it is important to
note that we do not argue for the exclusivity of these mechanisms in produc-
ing each of these relationship types but regard them as a few of many factors
that create and stabilize interpersonal commitments. Indeed, there is indica-
tion in the literature that our concept of emotional commitment is not broad
enough. Recent work argues that humans have evolved a general emotional
attachment drive, which in itself helps to develop a bond not only to children,
sexual partners and groups, but also to cultural ideas and abstract concepts
as well, resulting in the evolution of love and increased human intelligence
(Pedersen, 2004). Moreover, recent laboratory experiments show that children
develop strong emotional preference for objects they have become attached
to, independent of the objects’ physical characteristics, and are unwilling to
substitute them for perfectly identical duplicates (Hood and Bloom, 2007).
7.2.5 Limitations
A general limitation of the theoretical part of our work is that although our
evolutionary simulations were capable of examining and comparing millions
of different strategies that randomly emerged and competed, we still assumed
a mental model only along the dimensions of commitment, fairness, cooper-
ation and attractiveness. We had to do so in order to reduce the complexity
of our model, and to retain the interpretability of the results. However, this
also reduced the complexity of strategies explored, and could have inflated
the success of commitment strategies. Moreover, the simulations do not tell
us much about how feasible it was to initially invent the idea of commitment.
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A second limitation lies in the difficulty of separating mere exposure from
uncertainty reduction. There are two components that create uncertainty re-
duction in committed relationships, one is instrumental, the other is temporal.
Displaying one’s trustworthiness through sacrificing one’s own immediate in-
terest for the sake of the relationship is the instrumental component. Reiter-
ating the display of trustworthiness over an extended period of time is the
temporal component. While we argued for the effect of mere exposure on
commitment by separating it from the instrumental component of uncertainty
reduction (Chapter 5), we did not separate it from the temporal component.
This raises the question whether mere exposure is an independent factor or
simply an aspect of uncertainty reduction.
7.2.6 Avenues for future research
To address the first of the above limitations, the simulation model can be fur-
ther extended by making the model of the individual agent less specific and
more flexible. A more realistic model based on our current understanding of
how the human brain functions is perhaps the most attractive direction. One
of the currently applied paradigms for this approximation is neural networks
(see, for example Haykin, 1994). Its drawback is an exponential increase in
required computational power compared to our existing models.
The second limitation is more difficult to address. In order to separate the
effect of mere exposure and the temporal component of uncertainty reduc-
tion, a more precise, controlled measurement or manipulation of uncertainty
is required. Alternatively, the examination of uncertainty reduction from an
evolutionary perspective seems desirable. Our current theory classified the
effect of uncertainty on commitment under the rational motives. It is possi-
ble, however, that the avoidance of uncertainty itself is an evolved preference.
Further examination of its theoretical viability and empirical characteristics
could shed light on the credibility of this conjecture.
Our volume is among the initial attempts (see also Baumeister and Leary,
1995; de Vos et al., 2001; Pedersen, 2004) to provide an evolutionary account
for interpersonal commitment. It outlines an ultimate theory and at least one
proximate mechanism for how natural selection might have shaped a capacity
andwillingness to become committed to long-term partners. Tomake the evo-
lutionary claim stronger and more credible, much further research is needed.
One promising direction is to study how people cooperate in different
types of relationships, such as kinship, friendship and acquaintanceship. For
example, it is likely that each type of relationship is designed to solve cooper-
ation problems of a different size. Such work would help to further our un-
derstanding of the relative importance and place of interpersonal commitment
among other arguably cross-culturally stable tendencies of fair reciprocity, and
attachment toward kin. At the same time, it could provide further evidence
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for the evolutionary account of social bonding.
An important issue that we have not explored in this volume is the
counter-mechanism of mere exposure: satiation. Although mere exposure
to a stimulus creates a positive disposition, it can also lead to boredom or
even aversion from the stimulus. The same could probably be argued for
interpersonal relationships in some contexts. Thus it is likely that there is
a mechanism that acts in the opposite direction as our commitment bias.
Deriving such a mechanism from the evolutionary theory of interpersonal
commitment requires further theoretical work and empirical examination.
Despite these limitations and given the potential criticism against our ap-
proach that we discussed above, we believe that our work has made a con-
tribution to the comprehension of seemingly irrational decisions in durable
relationships. We found support for the notion that people instinctively stick
to their existing interpersonal relationships, more so than would seem rational
given the circumstances. We argued that this tendency could be the result of a
long-term evolutionary process. Furthermore, we advanced previous research
on the relationship between commitment and one of its key rational sources,
uncertainty.
Our efforts also testify to the importance of interdisciplinary research.
Without combining previous research and insights from psychology, soci-
ology, economics and evolutionary theory, most alternative explanations of
commitment remain limited in their power and scope. Together, they promise
to further our understanding of the wonderful and mysterious complexity of
human nature.

